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Abstract: Uniform regulatory standards, frequently employed in environmental health
and safety, are widely criticized as inefficient on the grounds that all firms are required to
comply, regardless of compliance cost. Since firms will self-select to comply only if their
compliance costs exceed the expected penalty for non-compliance, the inefficiency could
be avoided by an enforcement policy chosen to maximize social welfare. But we argue
that the enforcement agency goal is likely to place a larger weight on the benefits of
compliance than on the costs of compliance, which will produce distortions. We show
that the legislature can reduce the resulting distortions by limiting the enforcement agency
budget and by permitting the agenc artially to self-finance, by retaining a portion of its
noncompliance penalties. Finally, ifthe enforcement agency has a good "signal" of firms'
compliance costs, the distortions can be made very small by appropriate choice of the
enforcement budget.
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THE SOCIAL COST OF
UNIFORM REGULATORY STANDARDS
Abstract: Uniform regulatory standards are widely criticized as inefficient on the grounds
that all firms are required to comply, regardless of compliance cost. Since firms will self-
select to comply only if their compliance costs exceed the expected penalty for non-
compliance, the inefficiency could be avoided by an enforcement policy chosen to
maximize social welfare. But we argue that the enforcement agency goal is likely to place
a larger weight on the benefits of compliance than on the costs of compliance, which will
produce distortions. We show that the legislature can reduce the resulting distortions by
limiting the enforcement agency budget and by permitting the agency partially to self-
finance, by retaining a portion of its noncompliance penalties. Finally, if the enforcement
agency has a good "signal" of firms' compliance costs, the distortions can be made very
small by appropriate choice of the enforcement budget.
SOCIAL COST OF UNIFORM REGULATORY STANDARDS
Regulatory standards promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency
[EPA], the Occupational Safety and Health Administration [OSHA], and other agencies
charged with public safety are typically uniform: All firms must comply, regardless of
their compliance costs. The uniform standards are widely criticized as inefficient, on the
grounds that efficient standards would apply only to firms for which the social benefit
exceeds the social cost of compliance.1
This criticism of uniform standards is potentially shortsighted because it fails to
distinguish between the standards stipulated by the Congress or executive agencies and the
effective standards, represented by the pattern of compliance induced by enforcement.
Firms will self-select to comply with the standard only if the cost of compliance is less than
the expected fine for non-compliance. It is possible to achieve an efficient pattern of
compliance, despite the uniform standard, simply by setting an expected fine equal to the
benefit of a firm's compliance.2 The effectiveness of such a policy depends on how well
the enforcement agency can observe the benefits of each firm's compliance. If different
inspection policies can be applied to firms with different benefits of compliance, then the
socially efficient pattern of compliance could emerge. Although this argument requires
that the enforcement agency can observe the benefits of compliance, it is unnecessary for
the enforcement agency to observe firms' private compliance costs, since firms will self-
select to comply only if their private costs of compliance are less than the expected fine.
1efor exaple, Kneese und Sower C19683, Kneese and Schute C19751, Nichols and Zeckhauser
[19772, NIchols [19641, and the wide-ranging U.S. Senate Study on FederaL Regulations [19781.
2FurtherIore, as has often been pointed out, the cost of inspections theoreticaL Ly can be made
arbitrarily emall tby choosing fine rates arbitrarily Large, while aintaining the required expected fine.
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The efficient pattern of compliance will emerge only if the regulatory agency
chooses its enforcement policy to maximize social welfare, as measured by the benefits of
compliance net of all costs, including inspection costs and firms' private compliance costs.
To assume that the agency ignores firms' compliance costs in setting the uniform
standard, but respects firms' costs in enforcing it, seems inconsistent. The same political
pressures that constrain agency enforcement most likely constrain agency standard-setting.
The Congressional committees which craft enabling legislation for agencies such as EPA
and OSHA also oversee standard-setting and enforcement. These committees are
generally thought to attract advocates for their specific programmatic areas, rather than
being representative of Congress as a whole.3 The advocacy orientation is reflected, for
example, in the language of OSHA's and the EPA's enabling statutes, which focus on
the benefits of regulation, without reference to an efficient trade-off between the benefits
and costs of regulation.4 Any references to cost considerations or feasibility constraints
generally revolve around the political criterion of preventing plant closings.5
Another important influence on the agency (and Congressional committees) is
interest groups who lobby about environmental safety and health issues. Whereas lobbies
3 See, for example, Stigler [19713, Peltzmann (1976, 19841, and Becker [1983], who describe the
regulatory process as one in which organized interest groups divert the policy focus from the "public
interest" in order to serve their own more narrow interests.
4 For exaple, the occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) statute directs the agency
to implement standards which attain the "highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee"
(section 6(b)(5)]. The Envirormental Protection Agency (EPA) is mandated to set standards incorporating
"an adequate margin of safety" for all pollutants that "endanger the public health or welfare," (section
108). Between 1968 and 1978, Congress promulgated a wide range of "new" social legislation employing
similar regulatory strategies, including the Consumer Product Safety Act, Traffic Safety Act, Child
Protection and Toy Safety Act, Coal Nine Heal th and Safety Act, Surface Mining Control an Reclamation Act,
Truth-in-L~ending Act, and the Toxic Substance Control Act, amiong others.
- For exauple, at OSHA a consensus standard is considered economically infeasible at a
particular plant if implementation would seriously jeopardize the cited employer's long-term financial
profitability and competitiveness. For standards promulgated through rule-making Csection 6(b)(5)
standards), compliance with the standard would have to threaten the whole industry's long-term f inancial
profitability and competitiveness before any single plant in the industry could be exempted. See Nintz,
pp. 518-519.
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exist both for and against stringent environmental safety and health policies, the lobbyists
for stringent policies and enforcement have the strong statutory language to support their
side of the argument. The various environmental laws also provide for citizen law suits, a
threat which puts pressure on agencies to implement the statutory goals. Courts have
cited the statutory language in upholding the focus on benefits of compliance, with limited
reference to firms costs except when plants may shut down.' An enforcement policy that
maximizes social welfare (benefits of compliance, net of firms' costs) typically does not
maximize compliance or the benefits of compliance. If the agency were to use social
welfare as its enforcement goal, groups lobbying for environmental health and safety
issues could complain that the agency was ineffective, arguing that it would be possible to
increase compliance (or the benefits of compliance) without increasing the enforcement
budget.
For these reasons, it is reasonable to assume that an agency that has set uniform
standards7 will not necessarily enforce the standards in a way that maximizes social
welfare (benefits net of firms' costs). If the agency does not place equal weight on the
benefits and costs of compliance, uniform standards will lead to inefficient patterns of
6see Melnick (1984). In the Legal challenges to OSHA standards, the Supreme Court has never
supported use of the principle of economic efficiency in agency standard-setting. When the Court vacated
the benzene standard, it directed the agency instead to find "significant risk," a benefit-based concept,
before promulgating standards. (Industrial Union Department v. American Petrolem Institute, 448 US 607
(1980).) In the cotton dast decision, the Court explicitly rejected the use of cost-benefit analysis in
the development of OSNA health standards. (American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 US
490 (1981).)
For sieplicity, we study regulations that are "either/or": Either an automobile in California has
an emissions control device, or it does not. Either a coal-burning electricity plant installs smoke
scrubbers or it does not. Wile a model with variable coustliance levels would be richer, this sieple
model allows us to meke our mein points. OSNA generally establishes standards limi ting allowable
exposures to toxic sristances that are wrtiform across aLj plants, but several EPA laws distinguish between
old and new sources and among idstries -- ileposing uniform standards within categories, but not
necessarily across categories. The criteria for the distinctions are usually based on technological
feasibility, not net benefits. The condition critical to our argaent Is that the variation in compliance
costs across firms for a particular standard be sufficientlty large that the uniform standard is
inefficient. C. James Koch and Robert A. Leone [19783 reported the sidhstantlal variation In the costs of
comlying with iruf form water emission standards within the tissue paper industry. Albert L. Nichols
(19843 docuamented differences in costs of meeting uni form benzene air emission standards by manufacturers
of mleic anhydride.
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compliance. We examine the extreme case, in which the agency objective function has a
weight of one on the benefits of compliance and a weight of zero on the firms' costs of
compliance;' its enforcement goal then is to maximize the benefits of compliance subject
to its enforcement budget. If we can show that the inefficiency is small in this extreme
case, then it will be even smaller if the agency places some weight on firms' costs.
If an agency seeking to maximize the benefits of compliance could set its own fine
level, as well as allocate its inspection budget, it (theoretically) could achieve full
compliance with a vanishingly small budget (with "infinite" fines). Full compliance is
inefficient if some firms' costs exceed the benefits of compliance. In order to curb the
agency's overzealousness, it is necessary that the power to set the maximum fine rate and
the power to set the inspection budget be vested outside the agency. This is precisely how
the American system works: The appropriations committees of the Congress (not the
agency's oversight committee) set the agency's budget, and finite maximum fines are set
by the agency's enabling legislation." As a consequence, there is power in the budget to
curb the agency. If this power is exercised, the agency seeking to maximize compliance
will consider itself under-financed.
Lower fines require higher inspection budgets to achieve a fixed level of
compliance. By setting the fine rate higher, the social loss due to enforcement costs can
be reduced. In this paper, we take the fine rates to be fixed exogenously in the enabling
legislation. We use the term "first-best" to describe the pattern of compliance when the
agency maximizes benefits net of firms' private costs rather than of benefits of
compliance. But since we also assume fine rates are fixed, the policy is not truly first-best.
8 Alternatively, we could explore the case in ilch f irms with high costs of compliance have some
influence in setting goals for enforcement, resulting in a non-zero weight on compliance costs in the
agency goal. See, for exanpLe, Saron (19852.
9.lones (1988) suinmarizes the enabling legislation that sets various enforcement agencies' fine
rates.
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We investigate the divergence between the first-best pattern of compliance and the
pattern of compliance that emerges if the appropriations committee distributes the budget
to maximize social welfare,10 taking into account that each enforcement agency allocates
its budget inefficiently (maximizing the benefits of compliance rather than benefits net of
firms' private compliance costs.) The appropriations committees cannot set salaries or
fire agency administrators according to whether administrators choose enforcement
policies in the public interest; if they could, the appropriations committees could induce
the agency to maximize social welfare. The appropriations committees have available
only two weak budgetary instruments: the budget level itself and the power to set a rebate
policy in which the agency keeps a share of the fine revenue it collects. We explore the
power of these budgetary instruments to undo the inefficiencies that result from
inefficient enforcement by regulatory agencies.
Our main conclusions are: (i) The optimal budgetary policy is to limit the
enforcement budget, but also to require the agency partially to self-finance by retaining a
share of the fines it collects. (ii) Typically the first-best pattern of compliance cannot be
achieved by feasible budget instruments. However, the second-best will be close to the
first-best if each agency, which cannot observe firms' private costs of compliance directly,
has a good "signal" of each firm's private cost, and the inspection probability can depend
on this signal. (iii) Budgetary instruments may not be powerful in getting close to the
first-best if the signal of compliance cost is relatively uninformative.
10Appropriations coiittees are generally viewed as representative of Congress as a whole. See
Fenno, [19663 for the classic discusIon of the Congressional budgetary process, or AL en Schick, [19803,
Congress and Money, for coverage of more recent budget process history. Becker [19633 argues that, within
a representative body, even the *speclal interest" moel of government yields predictions that policies
will tend to correct market failtures .hilte at the sam time favoring the pol iticallty powerful.
11By a "signt, we mean an observable aspec t of the f irm that is correlated wi th I ts comp iance
cost. In addition to informal sources of information about cost avai labie through the enforcement
network, the federal government cotltects regulatory cost data in the process of individuaI rule-inking.
See, for exmpe, Research Triangle Institute, fRegulatory Analysis of the Proposed OSHA Standards on
Asbestos," prepared for OSNA and the USDOO., May 1964. Also, the U.S. Census Bureau repor ts data at the 4-
digi t SIC l evelt on the costs of dif ferent regulat ions based on an annual survey of 20,000 f irms. See
Evans (1966) for samry statistics.
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Section I describes the enforcement policy that maximizes social welfare (which we
call first-best), assuming the fine rate is fixed. Section II studies the second-best
enforcement policy, in which the Congressional appropriations committees choose the
optimal enforcement budget, taking into account that the enforcement agency maximizes
the benefits of aggregate compliance, rather than benefits net of firms' compliance costs.
The inspection policy can depend on the observable cost signals, which are
correlated with firms' true costs. When a signal is available, two types of inefficiency
occur in the second-best policy." First, in both the first-best and second-best policies,
some inspection classes with high cost signals (and high costs, on average) will not be
inspected at all, and will have no compliance. But the cutoff signals that separate
inspected classes from uninspected classes may differ in the first- and second-best.
Second, the patterns of compliance among inspected classes differ: In the second-best,
the compliance rate is uniform across all inspected sectors rather than varying inversely
with the cost signal as in the first-best.
In Section III, we show that by requiring the agency partially to self-finance from
its non-compliance fines, the appropriations committee can reduce distortions. Rebates
provide incentives for the agency to shift compliance from high-cost sectors to low cost
sectors. A different explanation that has been offered for why agencies should be allowed
to keep a share of their revenues is that rebates reduce moral hazard. When the effort
level of bureaucrats cannot be observed, rebates can induce them to work harder. We
show here that another useful incentive effect of rebates is to induce bureaucrats to
allocate the inspection budget more efficiently.
1%do not consider a third possibLe inefficiency which couLd occur in both the first-best and
the second-best contexts. In a one-period modeL where the penalty amount is Limited, the expected non-
comliance penalty may be too smalL to Induce couqplance where sociaLLy efficient even If the probabiLity
of inspection were one. (See Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1979), and Jones (1988)]. PenaLties can be
coqpountded If the agency's treatment of a firm can depend on the firs's history of coepliance. Since this
is true with both the distorted agency goal and the 'pubLic Interest"m agency goal, it is peripheral to
our concerns.
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, The rebate mechanism we have in mind is an implicit understanding between the
appropriations committee and the agency that last year's fine revenues will be considered
in this year's budget. The more direct mechanism of off-line budgeting also exists, though
it appears to be rarely used for non-compliance penalties received from violators.13
In Section IV, we show that if each noncompliant firm is costly to prosecute
(effectively imposing a negative rebate), the inefficiencies in the pattern of second-best
compliance among inspected classes is exacerbated. With no rebates, the compliance rate
would rise with the cost signal, contrary to the optimal pattern of compliance.
In Section V, we show that if the signal of firms' compliance cost is very
informative, budgetary control can make the allocative distortion small. Unfortunately,
the same is not true when the signal is only slightly informative. In that case, the agency's
induced pattern of compliance can be very far from optimal, and there is no power in the
budget to undo this problem. Social welfare might be enhanced if there were no cost
signal whatsoever.
For simplicity, the body of this paper discusses atemporal inspection policies: The
probability of inspecting any particular firm does not depend on its history of inspections
or compliance. Since there is no opportunity to bring noncompliant firms into compliance
as a consequence of the inspection, the only benefits of enforcement with an atemporal
policy arise through ex ante deterrence. In Appendix B we show that our main result, that
the social loss in the second-best is small if the cost signal is a good predictor of cost, still
holds when the enforcement agency can re-inspect and thereby accrue ex post benefits
from bringing firms into compliance, and firms know ex ante that this will occur only when
it is ex post reasonable for the inspection agency to reinspect.
13 1n 1967, 51063 (est.) in collections from non-federal sources for user fees, loan repayiments,
and penetty assessments went directly into agency budgets CUSGAO, 1987].
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I. First-best Regulation and Enforcement
We assume that firms have different unobservable costs, g, for complying with the
regulation. However, each firm has an observable cost signal, y, such as its industry or
product line. Since the signal is observable before inspection, the enforcement agency can
choose a different frequency of inspection for each cost signal, y. The cost of an
inspection is c and the fine imposed on a noncompliant firm is f. We assume the
allowable fine is fixed and not chosen as part of the enforcement policy. Budgetary
control depends on the fixed fine rate.
We assume that compliance costs in class y have mean y and are distributed
symmetrically around y according to H(g-y), on a support contained in (y-m,y+ m)."
Thus, each inspection class has the same distribution of costs, except for location. For
each y, H is differentiable and positive on the interior of its support.
If a firm in class y is inspected with probability p(y), it will self-select to comply if
g<p(y)f, and therefore the compliance rate in inspection class y will be H(p(y)f-y). This
self-selection by cost is why the pattern of compliance can be close to efficient even
though the compliance costs of individual firms are unobservable. There is no analogous
mechanism to make firms self-select by benefits, but if the agency wants to maximize
benefits of compliance, it will set higher expected fines in sectors where the benefits of
compliance are high. Since our arguments would be neither enriched nor undermined by
assuming that the benefits of compliance differ across firms, we assume the social benefit
of each firm's compliance is one. Aggregate benefits are ;i H(p(yi)f-yi). (With little loss
of generality and no loss of insight, we assume that all inspection classes are the same
size.)
14 The constraint that comp1liance costs are non-negative mear that cost signals are bounded away
from zero. We have parameterized the size of the sLqeport of h with one parameter, a, for convenience, buit
if the distribution were asymmetric, the density h might be zero on part of the domain (y-m,y+m).
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Since firms in any inspection class all face the same expected fine, there will be a
"cutoff" cost of compliance, G*(y), achieved by inspection probability p*(y)=G*(y)/f,
which separates compliant from noncompliant firms. G*(y) maximizes social welfare (1):
G
(1) SW(G,y) = H(G-y) - f g h(g-y)dg - cG/f
y-m
The first term is the benefit of compliance, the second term is the compliance cost
borne by firms, and the third term is the cost of inspections. If inspection class y is
inspected at all, the first-order condition describing the optimal G*(y) or, equivalently, the
optimal p*(y), is
(2) [1-G] - c/fh(G-y) > 0, with equality if H(G-y) <1.
We can differentiate (2) implicitly to see how the compliance rate optimally changes with
the cost signal within inspected classes. Assuming the objective function is strictly concave
at the optimum, and 0<H(G*(y)-y) <1, it follows that dG*(y)/dy < 1.
The optimal pattern of compliance is shown in Figure 1. The downward sloping
lines, 1-Gi, show the net benefit of bringing a marginal firm in sector i into compliance, as
the compliance rate Hi is increased in a low-cost sector, y1, and a high-cost sector, y2. At
a given compliance rate, H, the net benefit of bringing the marginal firm into compliance
is lower in the high-cost sector because the marginal firm at that compliance rate has a
higher compliance cost. The marginal inspection cost of increasing the compliance rate in
each sector is c/fh(G-y). If the density h is single peaked and symmetric, the marginal
cost of inspections will be as shown for both inspection classes, yi and y2. [If H(G1-
y1)=H(G2-y2), then h(G1 -y1)= h(G2 'Y2).] The second-order condition only requires
that the firms' net benefits curve, 1-0, cross the marginal cost curve for inspections from









low compliance cost sector
high compliance cost sector
c - cost of an inspection
f - non-compliance fine
G (= pf) = compliance cost of
marginal firm in compliance
H* - H(G*(y).- y) first best compliance rate in sector i
h = compliance density
Figure 1. First best enforcement strategy
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Since dG*(y)/dy < 1, the compliance rate declines with y: The high-cost class has
a lower compliance rate than the low-cost class at the social optimum.
High-cost inspection classes should not be inspected at all if the maximum possible
social welfare is negative.15 There is a "cutoff' cost signal, say Y*, above which inspection
classes should escape scrutiny. Compare two inspection classes, yi < y2. By definition,
SW(G*(yl),y1 ) > SW(G*(y2),y1). But, also, SW(G*(y2 ),y 1)> SW(G*(y2),y2), since
8 SW(G,y)/8 y < 0. It follows that if class y1 escapes scrutiny, class y2 does also.
II. Distortions in the Second-Best Agency's Inspection Policy
We now investigate the second-best pattern of compliance when the enforcement
policy maximizes benefits of compliance subject to an enforcement budget constraint.
Unlike in the social optimum above, we cannot separate the enforcement problems for
different inspection classes because, with a fixed budget, an increase in inspections in one
inspection class requires a decrease in another class. The enforcement agency chooses
G(y,E) (for each y) to maximize:
(3) I H(G(yi,E)-y;) subject to E = c I; [G(yi,E)/f]
where E is the enforcement budget. Here we have again substituted G/f for p. Provided
a class is inspected, the first-order condition describing the optimum is
(4) .[1/v(E)J- c / [fh(G(y,E)-y)J 2 0, with equality if H(G(y,E)-y) <1
151f the regulation applies to a prominent industry, selective non-enforcement may be politically
untenabte. For exmle, the corporate average fuel economy (cafe) standard apptles to the automobile
industry, which has three very large domestic participants. The costs at coipliance vary substantially
across the firms, but it is generally considered to be politically infeasible to enforce the standard
selectively within the industry. However, the consequence has not been full coupliance: The industry is
engaged in negotiations with the governmnt to revise the standard.
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where v(E) is the shadow value of an additional dollar in producing compliance. Since
the second-best agency does not incorporate firms' private compliance costs in its goal, the
marginal benefit perceived by the agency of increasing the compliance by one firm is one.
The marginal benefit 1/v(E) is the dollar value of marginal compliance, given that the
budget is constrained. In Figure 2, the perceived marginal benefit curve is horizontal,
therefore the marginal cost curve in panel 2A (with no rebates) must be increasing at the
optimum for an interior solution; that is, the second-order condition requires h' (.) <0.
An important feature of both the first- and second-best inspection patterns is that
some high-cost (high y) inspection classes may not be inspected at all, though the cutoff
may be different in the two cases. It takes a higher frequency of inspection to elicit a
given compliance rate from a high-cost inspection class than from a low-cost inspection
class. As in the first-best, eliciting compliance from firms in a high-cost inspection class
may cost more than its value to the enforcement agency. For y larger than some cutoff,
say Y, the net value H(G(O,E))-cv(E)[G(O,E)+y]/f will be negative, so p(y,E) = 0 and the
compliance rate is zero. In other words, though the agency does not care directly about
private costs of compliance, it nevertheless exempts high-cost inspection classes because
the budget is limited and it is costly to induce compliance from high-cost firms.
Within inspected classes, the compliance rate will be uniform in the second-best. It
may be uniformly too high in inspected classes (when h' >0 in the first-best and h' <0 in
the second-best) or it may be too high in high-cost classes but too low in low-cost classes
(when h' <0 in both the first- and second-best). Figure 2A illustrates the social cost of
uniform standards with second best enforcement for the latter case.
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H - second best compliance rate














R; - H( rG, H - second best compliance rate with rebates in sector I
h(.)
Figure 2. Social cost of uniform standards with second best
enforcement : Diffuse cost signals.
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III. The Incentive Effects of Rebated Fine Revenues
We now consider how rebated fines affect the pattern of compliance achieved by
the compliance-maximizing enforcement agency. With probability 1-H(.), an inspected
firm is noncompliant, and will be prosecuted and fined. We assume the appropriations
committees permit the agency to keep a fraction r of the fine revenues to finance other
inspections. As before, we can substitute G(y,E,r)/f for p(y,E,r) to describe the
enforcement agency's objective function. For each y, the enforcement agency chooses
G(y,E,r) to solve:
(5) Maximize I; H(G(yi,E,r)-yi) subject to
E = I; c [G(yi,E,r)/f] - rf i [G(yi,E,r)/f] [1-H(G(yi,E,r)-y;)]
If compliance in class y is positive, the first-order condition describing the optimum
is
1 c r[1-H(.)]
(6) -___ + ______- rG(.) 2 0
v(E,r) f h(.) h(.)
where, again, v(E,r) is the shadow value of an enforcement dollar in producing
compliance. The condition holds with equality if the compliance rate in class y is less than
one, and with inequality if all firms in class y comply.
When there are no fine rebates, the marginal cost of inspections, c/fb(.), is the
same in each inspection class at each compliance level H(.), as in Figure 2A. But with
rebates, the marginal cost curves in different inspection classes differ because the values
of fine rebates differ. With equal compliance rates, H, there are more inspections in a
high-cost class than in a low cost class, since it takes a higher probability of inspection to
make the same share of higher-cost firms comply. When thecompliance rate increases at
15
the margin, rebates are lost on more inframarginal inspections in a high-cost class than in
a low-cost class, and this makes the agency's effective marginal cost of inspections higher
in the high-cost sector.
Figure 2B illustrates that with fine rebates, the marginal cost curve for the high-
cost class lies above the marginal cost curve for the low-cost class. We have not shown
that the height of the line 1/v(E,r) will also change with r if E is held constant.) As a
result, compliance in the low-cost class will be larger due to the fine rebate, while
compliance in the high-cost class will be smaller. This shift will enhance efficiency, as
Figure 2B illustrates.
PROPOSITION 1: The optimal budget policy requires rebates as well as direct
budget, since rebates encourage the second-best agency to shift inspections from high-cost
classes to low-cost classes.
Etof: There are many combinations of rebates r and direct budgets E(r) that
induce the same fixed total expenditure on inspections, say E. Starting with no rebates,
r = 0, and the direct budget E(0)=E, we will show that a marginal increase in r [and the
corresponding decrease in E(r) required to hold expenditures on enforcement fixed]
increases social welfare. We will simplify notation by writing G(y,r) and v(r) instead of
G(y,E(r),r) and v(E(r),r).
Since total expenditures on inspections are fixed at c I; P(Yj) = (c/f) Ii G(yi,r),
constant total expenditures imply that X; [8G(.)/ar] = 0. Social welfare is
(7) SW = Xj 1~j-g) h(g-yi) dg - c/f Xi G(yi,r).
yi-m
Since the derivative of the last term with respect to r is zero, the change in social
welfare when r increases marginally is the derivative of the first term, or
16
(8) B SW / B r = ; [1-G(yi,r)] h(G(yi,r)-yi) [B G(yi,r)/ Br]
We will evaluate the derivative at the initial point, r = 0. Since the agency choice
of G(y,0)-y is constant for ally (from equation (4) above), h(G(y,0)-y) has the same value,
say h, for all y for which 0< H(.) <1. Therefore the derivative of social welfare at r = 0
has value
(9) h I; [BG(yi,0)/ Br] - h I; G(yi,0) [BG(yi,0)/ Br]
Since the first term is zero, we only need to show the last term is positive. Differentiating
(6) implicitly and then setting r = 0, we discover that, for inspection classes with positive
compliance, but not full compliance,
B G(y,0) -v(0) [1-H(G(y,0)-y) -G(y,0)h(G(y,0)-y)] + [dv(0)/dr] (c/f)
(10)
B r h'(G(y,0)-y)
The second order condition for (3) (or (5) at r=0) requires h'(.).<0. For the
following reason, it will not be cost-effective for the agency to have h' (.) =0. By symmetry
and single-peakedness of h, h' (.) = 0 would imply the compliance rate was 50% in all
inspected classes. Consider any two such classes. By symmetry of h, the cost-savings of
decreasing compliance in one class to zero is the same as the additional cost of increasing
compliance in the other class to one, and the same aggregate compliance is preserved.
But now there is an additional lump-sum cost saving in the sector whose compliance rate
has been reduced to zero, since it takes a non-trivial inspection cost (y-m)/f) to achieve
the lowest-cost firms' compliance in that class. This lump-sum saving means that the
compliance rates zero and one are less costly to achieve than compliance rate 50% in both
sectors, and therefore the second-best optimum will not have h' (.) =0.
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Since h(.), h'(.) and H(.) respectively have fixed values for all y when r=0, and
since h'(.) <0 by the second order condition, we see that 8 G(y,0)/8 r = a-bG(y,0) for
appropriate constants a and b >0.
A
Since G(y,0) is nonincreasing with y, it follows that there exists y such that
A A
8G(y,0)/ 8r < 0 if y>y and BG(y,0)/ 8r > 0 if y<y. It also follows that:
A
- G(yi,0) [8G(yi,0)/8r] . - X; G(y,0) [8G(yi,0)/ Br]
A
= - G(y,0) I; [8G(yi,0)/ Br] = 0
Thus, within the inspection classes with positive but not complete compliance,
social welfare increases with a marginal increase in r, from r = 0. There will be no change
in compliance of the inspection classes for which compliance is zero. The marginal
adjustment to r could generate at most a marginal saving in enforcement costs to be
applied to inspection classes with no compliance. The smallest probability of inspection
that will elicit positive compliance from such an inspection class is c(y-m)/f, which is
nonmarginal. Q.E.D.
We have implicitly assumed throughout the analysis that full compliance across all
sectors was inefficient. If alternatively, full compliance is efficient, but insufficient budget
were allocated to the enforcement agency to achieve it, rebates would still increase
efficiency.
IV. The Incentive Effects of Prosecution Costs
Our argument in Section I implies that, provided the enforcement agency
maximizes social welfare rather than aggregate compliance, there is no social loss due to
the uniform standard. Enforcement is costly because fine rates are finite, but conditional
on the finite fine rates, a benevolent social planner could not increase social welfare by
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choosing a nonuniform standard. The result does not hold if the agency must incur
prosecution costs to bring noncompliant firms into compliance. Suppose the enforcement
agency incurs prosecution costs, e, to document or litigate noncompliance. If the
regulatory standard could be nonuniform, the agency operating in the public-interest could
avoid prosecution costs (without changing incentives to comply) by stipulating that any
firm with compliance cost greater than G*(y) =p*(y)f is exempt. Since the only
noncompliant inspected firms would be exempt from compliance, no firms would be
prosecuted and the costs would be avoided. But with a uniform standard, prosecution
costs cannot be avoided when non-compliant firms are detected in inspected sectors. For
the second-best enforcement agency, a de jure obligation to prosecute firms detected to be
non-compliant would exacerbate the inefficient distribution of compliance among
inspected classes.
The enforcement problem with costly prosecution can again be described by (5),
except that we must substitute + e for -rf. Instead of getting a rebate rf for every
noncompliant firm it inspects, the enforcement agency pays a prosecution cost, e. The
incentives due to rebated fines are then reversed. Prosecution costs inefficiently shift
inspections from low-cost inspection classes to high-cost inspection classes. Initially, it
might seem surprising that the enforcement agency wants to shift inspections to high-cost
classes that are already heavily inspected, and therefore bear heavy prosecution costs. But
the intuition is analogous to the rebate case above: Frequent inspections of high-cost
classes increase compliance, thereby decreasing the expected prosecution costs. The
reduction in prosecution costs as compliance increases is greater in high cost sectors
because they require far more inspections to achieve a given cornpliance rate.
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V. The Costliness of the Second-Best Distortion and the Power of the Budget
To evaluate the severity of the efficiency distortions when the enforcement agency
maximizes aggregate compliance, rather than social welfare, it is instructive to consider
the two extreme cases, (i) there is no cost signal, and (ii) the cost signal is totally
informative. With no cost signal, the enforcement agency can observe nothing prior to
inspection, as in the first-best, and will inspect all firms with the same probability. There
will be a uniform "cutoff" cost level below which firms comply. The appropriations
committee can elicit the first-best pattern of compliance from the second-best
enforcement agency simply by providing the inspection budget that the first-best agency
would use.
At the other extreme, if y is a perfect signal of cost, all firms with signal y have the
same cost g=y. As in the social optimum, the probabilities of inspection will be
p(y,E) =y/f for y less than the cutoff determined by the enforcement agency's budget.
Therefore, by giving the second-best enforcement agency the same budget that would be
used by the first-best enforcement agency, the Congress can ensure that the resulting
pattern of compliance will be first-best. We conclude:
PROPOSITION 2: When (i) no cost signal is available, or (ii) the cost signal is
perfectly correlated with compliance cost, the Congress can achieve the first-best by giving the
second-best enforcement agency the budget that would be used in the first-best policy.
Except in the two extreme cases mentioned, the first-best cannot be achieved
merely by manipulating the second-best enforcement agency's budget. And even though
fine rebates help, they are not powerful enough to make the second-best pattern of
compliance coincide exactly with the first-best. It is therefore of interest to ask whether
the social loss of the second-best inevitably becomes small as the extremes are
approached.
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We say that cost signals become more informative if the distribution of compliance
cost, H, becomes more compressed around the mean, but the distribution of signals y is
fixed." Hence, the distributions of compliance cost in different classes overlap less as the
signal becomes more informative. We index a sequence of distributions by n=1,2..., and
let Hn(g-y) = H(n(g-y)). The support of Hn is contained in [y-(m/n),y +(m/n)] and the
density, hn(g-y) = nh(n(g-y)), becomes arbitrarily large on the interior of the support,
where h is positive.
We show in Appendix A that as the density hn becomes very large everywhere on
the interior of its support, the compliance rates in inspected classes approach one, in both
the first- and second-best. (A small increase in the probability of audit would otherwise
generate a huge increase in compliance.) Furthermore, the appropriations committee can
ensure that the high-cost inspection classes that escape scrutiny in the second-best are
close to those that escape scrutiny in the first-best, simply by providing the first-best
budget. Thus, since the first-best and second-best patterns of compliance become very
similar as n becomes large, the social cost vanishes. This result occurs whether or not
rebates are employed. Therefore:
PROPOSITION 3: (Appendix A) As the distribution of compliance cost in each
class becomes more concentrated around its mean y (n becomes large), the social loss in the
second-best converges to zero.
At the other extreme, we say that cost signals become less informative if the
distribution of signals y becomes more compressed around its mean, while the distribution
of compliance costs, H, remains fixed within each compliance class.17 Hence, the
distributions of compliance cost in different classes overlap more as the signal becomes
16For exaspe, if h~g-y)=(n/2a) on the support (y-(mt/n), y+(m/n)), the cost signal becomes more
informative if n becomes Larger. The distribution of signals remins fixed.
1For exaiple, if there are only two signals, y1 ad y2 ' the cost signaLs becom Less informmt ive
as these two signals move toward their mean, yE = (1/2)(y + y2 ).
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less informative. Unfortunately, it is not always true that the social loss in the second-best
becomes small as the distribution of y becomes concentrated at its mean. A condition
under which the social loss does become small is that the compliance-cost density h is
strictly declining at the first-best. This condition is violated when h is uniform and, if the
first-best compliance cutoff is less than the mean, when it is normal. The following
example illustrates what can go wrong.
Example: Suppose h is uniform on [y-(1/4),y+(1/4)], with density 1/2, and there
are two inspection classes, y1 < y2. If c=f=1, and the benefit of a firm's compliance is
one, G*(y) =1/2 in both inspection classes (provided neither cost signal is so high that
optimality requires zero inspections). Optimal compliance rates in the two classes differ,
but they become close as y2 and y1 become close. However, if the second-best
enforcement agency inspects an inspection class at all, it elicits full compliance from that
inspection class.18 [In (4), h is constant.] Thus, the enforcement agency will elicit full
compliance from class y1, and no (or partial) compliance from y2 (depending upon its
budget). As the distributions of compliance cost become very close (as one signal becomes
close to the other), this pattern persists. As a result, a large social loss persists because
high-cost firms in the low-signal class will comply, but low-cost firms in the high-signal
class will not comply. This pathology cannot be avoided by letting the agency self-finance
through fine rebates. End of Example.
The interpretation of this example is that a little information might be a bad thing.
If the. mean compliance costs in two industries differ only slightly, the second-best
enforcement agency may enforce one of them heavily and the other not at all, which may
be very far from optimal. In this example, the inefficiency cannot be avoided by
controlling the budget or by rebating fines.
18The one possible exception is the highest-cost inspection eLass it inspects: the agency may run
out of budget before it can induce full coapliance from this class.
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Nevertheless, Proposition 2 (the social loss vanishes as the signal becomes close to
perfect) survives. As the signal becomes perfect, compliance rates in inspected classes
become close to one, and by controlling the budget, the appropriations committee can
ensure that the number of uninspected classes becomes close to the number in the first-
best.
VI. Conclusions
This paper is motivated by the observation that when regulatory agencies set
uniform standards, it is reasonable to assume that they enforce those standards in a way
that places more weight on the benefits of compliance than on firms' private compliance
costs. Such an enforcement goal introduces distortions from the socially efficient
outcome. If such an agency could choose its own budget or the fine rate, it would be
overzealous in its enforcement efforts, relative to the efficient level of enforcement. We
have discussed the power of feasible budget instruments to control the overzealous
agency. By restricting the agency budget, the Congressional appropriations committees
can induce the agency to avoid inspecting the higher cost inspection classes for which
compliance is inefficient. By requiring the agency partially to self-finance from its non-
compliance penalties, Congress can mitigate the inefficient distribution of compliance
among inspected classes. On the other hand, if prosecution is costly (negative fine
rebates), the inefficient distribution of compliance will be exacerbated.
If the agency has a good signal of firms'unobserved compliance costs, setting the
second-best budget level can substantially undo the distortions in patterns of compliance.
With a good cost signal, the inefficient distribution of compliance within inspected classes
is secondary in importance to the fact that both the first- and second-best policies
concentrate attention on inspection classes with low cost.
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The pattern of compliance can be close to efficient because firms self-select on the
basis of compliance cost whether to comply. There is no analogous mechanism to make
them self-select on the basis of benefits. We assumed throughout that benefits were
equal across all sectors. However, if benefits of compliance varied across sectors the
conclusions would be unchanged, so long as the enforcement agency incorporates the
benefits of compliance in its enforcement goal and therefore enforces high-benefit sectors
more intensively than low-benefit sectors.
Alternatively, an agency may simply maximize compliance, rather than benefits of
compliance. In this case, if benefits vary across firms the welfare results about rebates
may be compromised. For example, if benefits are closely correlated with the costs of
compliance, then uniform compliance rates in the second-best may be very close to
optimal. In the case where net benefits of compliance increase with the costs of
compliance, rebates would induce inefficiencies.
Although we have assumed throughout that fine rates are fixed by the enabling
legislation that created the enforcement agency, our discussion also suggests a partial
explanation for why the enforcement agency is not allowed to choose fine rates. By giving
agencies the power to set fines, Congress would forfeit the power of the enforcement
budget, since full compliance could then be achieved costlessly. For any enforcement
budget, the second-best enforcement agency could choose penalties sufficiently high to
induce full compliance. The appropriations committee can prevent this inefficient
outcome by reserving the power to set both fine rates and the enforcement budget. In
contrast to other explanations in the literature for why optimal fine rates are bounded,19
this explanation rests on the hierarchical agency problem in which the higher-level
principal seeks budgetary control over the lower-level principal with inefficient goals.
19For exmle, inf in ite f ines ay lead to an inef f icitentlty arge loss in ut iti ty i f consauers are
risk inverse and constamrs sometimes fail to coqply because their benefits of noncouplance are high
(Polinsky and Shavelt (1979)) or because there is randoeness in whether they are convicted (Snyder (1987).
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To streamline the argument, we assume there is a continuous distribution of y, F(y).
We first define some notation in order to state Proposition 2 more precisely. Let
SW(G*(y,n),y,Hn) be social welfare, analogous to (1), when the distribution of compliance cost
is Hn, and G*(y,n) is the optimal "cutoff" in class y. Suppose the first-best optimal inspection
budget is E*n. Let SB(E*n,Hn) be the social surplus in the second-best enforcement policy
with budget E* . To show that the social loss in the second-best converges to zero as n
becomes large, it is enough to show that it converges to zero when the budget is E*n. The
true social loss in the second-best, with the optimal budget, is even less and also converges to
zero. Therefore, we show:
Proposition 2: For each 6>0, there exists N(6) such that for all n> N(6),
I f SW(G*(yn),y,Hn) dF(y) - SB(E*n,Hn) <6.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Lemma 1: For any s>0, there exists nl(s) such that, if n>n1(e) and y_[f-cE]/[f +c], then
Hn(G*(y,n)-y) >1-E.
Proof- Since we have assumed that h is positive 'on the interior of its support,
therefore hn becomes unbounded for large enough n at any point interior to its support, and it
follows that a solution to the first-order condition (2) requires that Hn(G*(y,n)-y) is close to
zero or one, or that G*(y,n) is close to one. The latter is ruled out, since y is strictly less than
one and there is no firm with compliancecost one in thesupportofH°,providednislarge
enough. Let G**(y,n) represent the solution to (2) for which Hfl(G**(y,n)-y) is close to or
equal to one. Choose n1(a) large enough that, for n>n1 (a), Hn(G**(y,n)-y)>1-s and nm/n < s
The net social benefit of inspecting class y with compliance rate Hn(G*(y,n)-y) is greater
than [H"(G**y,n)-y)[1-y]-[c/fJ[f/[f+ c]], since the average compliance cost of complying firms
ZSB(E*nHnl)fun(G(yn)-y)dF(y)ffG(yef)tJn(G(yn)-y)dF(y) - cf[Gvy,n)/fdFy).
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is no greater than the mean compliance cost y, and the cost of inspections is no greater than
the last term, since the maximum compliance cost incurred in class y is less than f/[f+c]. Since
Hn(G**(y,n)-y)>1-e, the net social benefit is greater than [1..e][1-y].[c/fJ[f/[f+cJ], which is
positive for y as chosen.
On the other hand, if Hn is close to zero, the value of compliance is close to zero,
while the cost of inspections is no less than c[y-(m/n)]/f (since the minimum compliance cost
in class y is y-(m/n)), and therefore, if Hn approached zero, the net social benefit would be
negative. It follows that G*(y,n)=G**(y,n) (that is, Hn(Gh(y,n)-y) is close to one, rather than
zero), and the result follows. QED
Lemma 2: For any e>0, there exists n2(e) such that, if n>n2 (s) and if y>e+f/[f+c), then
Hn(G*(y,n)-y)=0.
Proof: Take n2(e) =m/e. Then the minimum compliance cost g in such a class exceeds
f/[f+c]. The net social benefit of compliance in class y is less than
(Hn(G*(y,n)-y)[1-f/[f+cJ]-c[e + f/[f+ c]]/), which is negative even if Hn(G*(y,n)-y)=1. QED
Turning to the second-best, let G(y,n) be the second-best compliance rate in class y,
when the enforcement budget is E'n.
Lemma 3: For any e>0, there exists n3(e) such that, if n>n 3(), Hn(G(yn)-y)>1-e in
inspected classes.
Proof: It follows from (5) that since hn becomes unbounded everywhere interior to the
support, Hn(G(y,n)-y) approaches zero or one. We pointed out in the text that the compliance
rate in all inspected classes will be the same. Suppose this uniform compliance rate in
inspected classes approached zero. Even though the compliance rate in high-cost classes is
close to zero, the frequency of inspections p(y,n) is not; it is larger than [y-(m/n)]/f (which is
the inspection rate that gets the lowest-.cost firm in class y to comply), and for n large enough,
this is larger than 2m/n. The maximum increment to the inspection rate required to get full
compliance in any one inspection class is 2w/n. Therefore, if compliance rates were close to
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zero in all inspected classes, the enforcement agency could reduce the inspection rate in a
high-cost class by 2m/n and increase the inspection rate by that amount in another class, thus
giving up a very small amount (close to zero) of compliance in the high-cost class, but getting
full compliance from the other class to which those inspections were added. We conclude it
cannot be optimal for the uniform compliance rate in all inspected classes to approach zero as
n becomes large. QED
Let Y'n represent the maximum cost signal in the first-best policy for which the
compliance rate is positive. Let Yn(E~n,n) represent the maximum cost signal in the second-
best policy (with budget E"n) for which the compliance rate is positive.
Lemma 4: For any 6>0, there exists n4(6) such that, if n>n4(6),
| F(Y*n)-F(f/[f+cJ) I <S and | F(Yn(E~n,n))-F(f/[f+c)I <6.
Proof: It follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 that Y* n converges to f/[f+c], and the first
result then follows by continuity of F (since we have assumed the distribution of cost signals is
atomless). Since the compliance rate in inspected classes in the second-best converges to one,
as it does in the first-best, Yn(E*n,n) must converge to the same thing as Y'n, namely f/[f+c].
The second result also follows by continuity of F. QED.
Lemma5: For any E>0, there exists n5(£) such that, if n>n5 (e), Hn(G(yn)-y)>
1-s in all classes ys[f-ecj/(f+c).
Ewoof This adds to Lemma 3 that all classes less than [f-sc]/[f+ c] will be inspected for
large enough n. This follows from Lemma 4, since the cutoff Y(E~nn) converges to f/[f+c].
QED
We will add up the social loss of the second-best from three nonintersecting groups of
inspection classes: (a) a group for which compliance is at least 1-s in both the first- and
second-best, (b) a group with no compliance in either the first- or second-best, and (c) the
remaining classes. For s>O, group (a) will consist of those classes ys[f-ec]/[f+c]. For n larger
than max~n1 (s),n3(s),n5 (e)}, the compliance rates for those classes in the first- and second-best
policies are greater than 1-s, and therefore the social loss from the difference in patterns of
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compliance is less than eF([f-ec]/[f+cJ). There is no social loss to classes represented by (b).
By continuity of F (when F is atomless), for every 6>0, we can choose e small enough so that
| F([f-ec]/[f+c])-F(f/[f+c])| <S. Because of this and Lemma 4, for every 6>0, we can choose
s>0 so that the measure of classes (c), max{I F(Yn(E~n,n))-F([f-ec]/[f+c])|l,IF(Y~n)-F
([fec]/[f+ ci) I }, is less than 26. The maximum social loss in each such class is at most one (the
social value of compliance), so the total social loss in group (c) is less than 26. Define ry to be
the maximum social loss in groups (a) and (c), 'y=eF([f-Ec]/[f+c])+26. To complete the proof,
we need to show that for any 'y>0, there exists N(7), such that, if n>N(y), the social loss is less
than 7. Choose 6 <'y/2, and choose e >0 so that 'ysF([f-EC]/[f+c])+26, and so that




PROPOSITION 2 WITH FOLLOW-UP INSPECTIONS
In the text we focused on the deterrent effect of inspections and fines. We assumed
that firms cannot be brought into compliance during the inspection, because compliance
requires a major change in policy or installation of capital equipment. Bringing firms into
compliance would require a follow-up inspection, and thus leads us into the difficult area of
intertemporal enforcement policies. Here we show that the major result in our paper,
Proposition 2 (that the social loss in the second-best is small if the cost signal is a very good
predictor of compliance cost), emerges intact if the enforcement agency has a rational
intertemporal policy of follow-up inspections to bring firms into compliance.
We assume that, having discovered noncompliance and observed the firm's cost, the
enforcement agency will choose ex post whether to promise reinspection.21 The probability of
inspection required to achieve compliance in the second round is g/f, provided the
enforcement agency can commit to that probability. But, unlike the first round, in which
many similar firms are subject to inspection, and therefore the frequency of inspection is
observable, the firm observes in the second round only whether it gets inspected. Since this is
a firm-specific matter, "probabilities" are unobservable. We therefore assume that the
enforcement agency cannot credibly commit to "probabilities" in the second round. Rather, it
commits to inspect or not, and if it commits to inspect, the firm complies if g<f.22
The argument underlying Proposition 2 had two parts. First, we showed that in both
the first- and second-best, there is a set of high-cost inspection classes with no compliance.
Second, we showed that as the signal becomes more informative, the compliance rates in
ZAn alternative would be that the inspection agency chooses ex ante the probabilities of follow-
up inspections for nonconmtliant firms, and commits to them. Such a policy would not be subgm perfect"
since the agency would want to change its mind after the noncoiipliant firm is found.
~Enforcement costs are thus higher than if the agency could credibly commit to "probabiLities" of
inspection in the second round, but in both cases, Proposition 2 survIves. This is essentially because,
as the signal becomes a perfect predictor of cost, almost all inspected firms are comliant, and, since
almost no inspected firm are found noncompliant, the difference between inspecting them with probability
one or a lower probability does not matter.
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inspected classes become arbitrarily close to one in both the first- and second-best. It follows
from these two considerations that if the second-best enforcement agency has the optimal
inspection budget used by the first-best enforcement agency, the pattern of compliance elicited
becomes very close to the first-best pattern of compliance as the signal becomes more
informative. Proposition 2 extends to the case of follow-up inspections if these two properties
remain. When the budget is fixed by Congress, the second property follows from the first.
We consider first the first-best pattern of compliance elicited by the enforcement
agency if it maximizes social welfare. We assume that all compliance costs, g, are less than the
fine f, so the firm will comply if it was found noncompliant in the random inspection and
expects a follow-up inspection with probability one. A firm will comply voluntarily before
the random inspection if gsp[f+g], or g/f+g]sp. Since g/[f+g] increases with g, inspection
frequency p(G)=G/[f+G] will cause all firms gsG to comply. (We notice that p never needs to
exceed 1/2, since all firms with cost g less than f would then comply.) It is optimal to
promise reinspection if 1>c+g; that is, the benefit of compliance exceeds the cost of inspecting
the firm to enforce compliance plus the compliance cost. The first-best objective function,
for class y, can then be written (analogously to (1)):
1-c
(B1) H(G-y) + p(G) f (1-c-g)dH(g-y) - cp(G)
G
where p(G) = G/[f+ GJ. If class y has positive compliance, the first-order condition describing
G*(y) is2 3  1-c
(B2) h(G-y) [1-p(G)[1-c-G]] + [f[1-c-g~dH(.) - c] dp(G)/dG 0
G
with equality if H(G*(y)-y) <1. Now substitute hn for h. Since p(G)s1/2 and dp(G)/dG is
bounded, (B2) is positive for any G interior to the support of hn, for large enough n, since hn
becomes unbounded. Hence, compliance in inspected classes approaches one as n becomes
large.
~This is provided G*(y)<1-c. Otherwise, there wiLl be no follow-up inspections, since the second
term of (81) would be negative.
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Suppose that for all G, the value of (Bi) is negative for class y1. Since the derivative
of (Bi) with respect to y is negative for fixed G, the value of (Bi) for y2>y 1 is less than the
value for y1 for each G, and therefore, if class y1 escapes scrutiny, y2 does as well. There is
a cutoff signal Y* above which no compliance is elicited.
We turn now to the second-best.
In the second-best, the opportunity cost of eliciting compliance with a follow-up
inspection is the foregone deterrence benefits from random inspections in the next time period.
This cost depends on the budget, E, as set by Congress. We have already shown that with no
follow-up inspections, the second-best pattern of compliance has the two properties required
for Proposition 2. Therefore, we discuss the other case; that noncompliant firms are brought
into compliance. Since the foregone deterrence is v(E)c when cost c is diverted to a follow-up
inspection, and the benefit is one, follow-up inspections require 1-v(E)c>0.
The second-best enforcement problem is then to maximize by choice of G, where
p(G) = G/[G + fJs1/2,
(B3) f H(G-y)dF(y) + f p(G(y))[1-H(.)JdF(y)
subject to E = c j p(G(y))dF(y) + c J p(G(y))[1-H(.))]dF(y)
Class y will have zero compliance if the following expression is negative for all G and
p(G), where v(E) is the shadow price of a marginal dollar of enforcement budget, E:
(B4) H[G-y] + p(G) [1-H(.)] - v(E) c p(G) [1+ [1-H(.)J
Since this expression is declining in y for fixed G, it follows again that if class yi is allowed
zero compliance, class y2>y1 is also allowed zero compliance. Again, there is a "cutoff' signal,
say Y, above which p(G(y)) -0, and no firms comply.
If compliance in class y is positive, the firt-order condition describing the second-best
compliance rate is
(B5) h(.) [1 - p(G(y)) [1-v(E)c]] + [1-H(.)] p'(G(y))-v(E)c [1 +[1-H(.)] p'(G(y))2~ 0
with equality if H[G(y)-y] <1.
34
To consider the compliance rates in inspected classes as n becomes large, substitute hn
for h and Hn for H. For any G in the interior of the support of hn, the value of (B5) is
positive for large enough n, since hn becomes unbounded. Therefore, the compliance rates in
inspected classes must converge to one as n grows large. This completes our demonstration of
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